Case reference: Francis v. Baker, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250
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Family law — Divorce — Maintenance — Federal Child Support Guidelines — Meaning of word “inappropriate” in s. 4(b) of Guidelines — Father with annual income of $945,000 ordered to pay $10,000 per month in child support for his two children — Whether trial judge properly exercised discretion to award Table amount of child support applicable to father’s income — Whether downward variation of Table amounts permissible where paying parent has annual income exceeding $150,000 — Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, s. 4(b).
The parties were married in 1979. At that time, the appellant was employed as a lawyer in a large Toronto law firm while the respondent worked as a high school teacher. The parties’ first child was born in 1983. The appellant left the family in July 1985 when their second child was five days old. The respondent returned to work full-time three months later. The parties divorced in 1987. In 1988, the respondent applied for an increase in child support. At trial, nine years later, she amended her pleadings to include a claim for child support pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines, which were to come into effect shortly and were intended to apply to all pending child support orders. The respondent earned $63,000 per year at the date of trial. Under the terms of a separation agreement, she also received $30,000 per year in child support payments from the appellant. The appellant earned $945,538 per year and his net worth is estimated at $78,000,000. The trial judge exercised her jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to award the respondent the Table amount of child support applicable to the appellant’s income or $10,034 per month for both children. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The court concluded that the word “inappropriate” in s. 4(b) of the Guidelines must mean “inadequate” and, consequently, that no downward variation of the Table amounts was permissible under this section. In the alternative, the court found that even if paying parents earning more than $150,000 could argue for reductions in child support awards under s. 4, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in finding that the Table amount was not inappropriate in the circumstances of this case.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed.
A proper construction of s. 4 of the Guidelines requires that the word “inappropriate” be broadly defined to mean “unsuitable” rather than merely “inadequate”, leaving the courts the discretion to both increase and reduce the amount of child support prescribed by its strict application. Conflicting authority at the appellate level on the proper interpretation of the provision can be resolved by applicable principles of statutory interpretation. Pursuant to a purposive interpretation of s. 4 — that is, the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the word “inappropriate” within the scheme and objectives of the Guidelines – there is no ambiguity in its language. With respect to the broader context, the interpretation that the word “inappropriate” means “inadequate” for the purposes of s. 4 is inconsistent with the established principle that where the same word is used on multiple occasions in a statute, one is to give the same meaning to that word throughout the statute. Further, a proper construction of s. 4 requires that the objectives of predictability, consistency and efficiency on the one hand be balanced with those of fairness, flexibility and recognition of the actual “condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the children” on the other. A broad interpretation of the word “inappropriate” in s. 4 does not deny children of high income parents any of the intended benefits of the Guidelines because these have not displaced the Divorce Act, which clearly dictates that maintenance of the children, rather than household equalization or spousal support, is the objective of child support payments. In order to recognize that objective, as well as to implement the fairness and flexibility components of the Guidelines’ objectives, courts must therefore have the discretion to remedy situations where Table amounts are so in excess of the children’s reasonable needs that they no longer qualify as child support.
Parliament intended that there be a presumption in favour of the Table amounts. Guideline figures can only be increased or reduced under s. 4 if the party seeking such a deviation has rebutted that presumption of appropriateness. The evidence in its entirety must be sufficient to raise a concern that the applicable Table amount is inappropriate. Only after examining all of the circumstances of the case, including the factors expressly listed in s. 4(b)(ii), should courts find Table amounts to be inappropriate and craft more suitable child support awards.
Parliament did not choose to create a blanket rule requiring custodial parents to produce child expense budgets in all cases where s. 4 of the Guidelines is invoked. Trial judges must determine on a case-by-case basis whether such budgets will be required. In the present case, there was no improper exercise of discretion. While child expense budgets may be required under s. 4 in order to allow for a proper assessment of the children’s needs, custodial parents need not justify each and every budgeted expense. Child expense budgets constitute evidence on which custodial parents can be cross-examined, but their inherent imprecision must be kept in mind. Furthermore, the unique economic situation of high income earners must be acknowledged. A proper balance is struck by requiring paying parents to demonstrate that budgeted child expenses are so high as to exceed the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.
The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial judge improperly exercised her discretion to award the Table amount on the facts of this case. In order to obtain a new trial, the appellant must meet that burden. The appellant’s sheer size argument is unacceptable given the presumption in favour of the Guideline figures, the fact that Parliament did not create an additional distinction within the high income earning group, and finally the fact that focussing solely on the size of the child support payment disregards one of the factors relevant to the appropriateness inquiry, the needs of the children. Parliament did not choose to impose a cap or upper limit on child support payments, and the appellant has advanced no reason why this Court should do so. The trial judge properly considered all of the circumstances of the case in awarding the respondent additional discretionary expenses.
*source: Lexbox
